Immigration and the politics of left-wing housing reform

Feb 26, 2026 | Advocacy, Featured

Opinion piece submitted by BAC member Ed Smith.

One thing that the progressive left and property developers can agree on is that high and indiscriminate immigration is always a good thing. Tragically for the tenants for whom the left speaks, high and indiscriminate immigration, and the division it sews in communities, actually frustrates the left’s political success.

Australia has high migration, including streams of low skill, demand driven immigration. This article explores how immigration reduction is in fact essential to the success of progressive politics. In this article we explore how that paradigm affects Australia’s leading progressive organisation, the Australian Greens and their housing policy.

The Greens housing reform agenda includes ending of concessions for property speculators (capital gains tax discounting and negative gearing) and spending the expected increased revenue on public housing. This is unremarkable progressive  politics which aims to move money from rich to poor. It is also a feature of Georgist economics which believes there is a benefit in moving the tax base away from productive activities like work.

The British Australian Community is non-partisan, in form and in substance. We neither hold nor offer an opinion on the merits of the Australian Greens policies. This piece serves only to explain the relevance of immigration to those people who are supporters of these policies.

This article takes support for the Greens’ policy agenda as given and discusses how immigration can help bring it to fruition. Specifically, immigration is relevant to the restoration of social capital and social solidarity and the closing of the political feedback loop that occurs from closing the labour market.

Reduction of solidarity

In his ever ignored, always disavowed but never impugned E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century Harvard Scholar Robert Putnam explains how immigration and diversity reduce social capital and social solidarity.

Behind the dry sociological terms of social capital and solidarity is a grim insight. Putnam details the chilling phenomenon of ‘hunkering down’. Immigration and diversity tend to cause people to give up on their community and its institutions and ‘hunker down’ into their families.

This affects trust in government, confidence in people’s ability to influence government, charitable giving, volunteering and trusting neighbours. People just appear to invest less in diverse communities. This is of profound importance because things like social capital and social solidarity are critical inputs to collective action from a large community or nation.

Putnam’s work is the most famous example of this phenomenon, yet the broad trend is bigger than his work and draws from the core of the human condition. The more you have in common with a group and the more you trust you will get something back from it, the more you will invest in its success.

This is a much-muted issue because – just like the Soviet invasion of Poland, John Howard’s gun buyback and Noam Chomsky’s friendship with Jeffrey Epstein, it sits awkward and friendless on the left-right spectrum. The noisiest people in politics are those with simple, binary rubrics of left and right. Putnam’s thesis crashes that party.

The thought that immigration, that policy cherished by the high left, could be incinerating the economic agenda of the old left, just hurts to say. It requires thought and courage and effort to engage with. For those who’d rather yell about politics, it is irksome. It is however quite real, and so it is imperative that we engage with it.

As was demonstrated by the Australian Labor Party in the 2019 election and by the Greens in the 2022 and 2025 elections, redistributive economics as a tool for building a fairer housing system are politically difficult. Such campaigns pit the community against property developers and their supplicant think tanks, governments against the mortgage belt electorates and donors, and tenants against landlords – David and Goliath. David needs all the help he can get. Social capital and social solidarity are critical inputs to any progressive reform agenda.

Social solidarity is the why. People are more easily sold on the progressive politics of sharing resources when they see themselves in the collective.  This is an uncomfortable truth, but it is still true. In another important study, it was shown that people will literally help strangers more if they are wearing one of their football team’s jersey. Reforming the housing system will require politicians to successfully ask people to care for others and to do that at a vast scale required for winning elections. In the face of a hostile big business sector, that will be hard. The work of Putnam and others suggests that will be harder in a diverse society.

For those intent on reforming tax incentives in the housing market, social capital is the how. Social capital is the set of lubricating bonds that smooth difficult moments between groups and so raise the potential for what can be achieved. For example, the Australian Labor party, was founded by the trade union movement and drew heavily from the Roman Catholic church. When people met in the party many already had deep relationships or at least shared norms and experiences. This eased their co-operation.

Even for strangers, their familiarity with trade union organising gave them common norms and heritage for political organising. When people who have had each other’s back in a dispute with an employer meet in a political party they have a level of trust and faith that lets them pursue riskier, harder and more difficult campaign strategies. They have a bigger arsenal.

In a diverse community however, our racial and religious differences reduce social capital. This is a retardant for the co-operation necessary for collective politics. As everybody who has tried to organise volunteers knows, politics is quite hard work.

Consider door knocking. It is the gold standard for changing voters minds but also painful, thankless work for volunteers. Its labour intensivity also means it is the only structural advantage labour has over capital. Whether it is the organiser calling volunteers to come on Saturday, or the volunteers out door knocking on Saturday, the song remains the same. It is easier when Chistian is inviting Mary to door knocking; Muhammed is door knocking Mohamed and Tuan is door knocking Hung. Diverse coalitions are still possible they are just weaker. If you want collective politics, you really need a collective.

Immediate offset of progress

Another vital trait of immigration for a progressive political agenda is the way that it can strengthen or dampen feedback loops – how much benefit voters get for their efforts. The more porous the border the more rapidly any material improvements will be offset. The tighter the border the more the material gains at the bottom will concentrate and reward progressive volunteers. This will then keep the political machine intact in three years’ time because voters and volunteers see a benefit flowing from the election.

The reforms proposed by the Greens would in the best-case scenario take six months to legislate and plan, and at least another year for actual public housing stock to hit anywhere near scale and start denting rents. This means the progressive agenda would really require two election victories in a row.

Imagine a minority labour government reliant on a Green crossbench in 2028, which rolled out the greens housing agenda. When the Greens and Labor party machinery began its second electoral campaign in 2031 in this scenario, they would be calling volunteers to whom they had previously promised lower rents in 2028.

The problem is that the ending of property speculation concessions, reallocation of revenue to public housing and temporary decrease in rents would be very quickly offset by more economic migrants attracted to the better cost of living. The average Australian voter would be no better off. The Greens would be humiliated and their volunteers disillusioned.

Here is the dilemma. Any reduction in rent to make a difference electorally would have to be significant enough for people to feel it three years later. But any such reduction would also improve the costs and benefits of economic immigration by increasing their disposable income.

Of particular relevance here are demand driven, uncapped visas, with short processing times and low or no income thresholds (though all economic visas would be affected albeit not as much). The New Zealanders and Core Skills stream of the Skills in Demand visa are two such visas.

New Zealand visas have effectively no processing time as they are issued on arrival at Australian airports. For the core skills visa, the Department of Home Affairs aims to process 90% of applications within seven months – much less than the parliamentary triennium.

These visas can bring in low wage workers. Average incomes in Australia are about $105,000 but the core skills visa can be issued for employment for as low as $76,515 per annum. The New Zealand visa has no minimum income requirement. While there will be many people on the core skills visa and especially the New Zealand visa earning much more, there will be a cohort of low wage holders for whom say a 10% drop in rents would be material in their decision to immigrate. Critically, the New Zealand visa requires no job offer.

A progressive political machine that fought and won in early 2028, legislated collective policies in late 2028, saw rents slow in 2029 would see migration pick up rapidly in 2030 and improvement slowed or even halted by the next election. When the Green and Labor organisers set out in 2031 to rally the troops said troops will privately ask, ‘Why did my rent not fall? Why should I bother again?’.

The way ahead

Australia’s diverse demography and racial and religious divisions are here to stay. What is up for grabs though is what happens next. High migration means more division on racial and religious lines. Low migration means less division so relatively more social capital and social solidarity. The effects of this would be marginal but they would pile up over the years and would impact every other domain of public policy. Moreover, as the fate of the last big effort to buy back the farm showed (Kevin Rudd’s still born 2010 mining tax) every last benefit at the margin is needed.

Low levels of migration would create a structural boost for the grass roots David and Goliath struggle required to confront the property industry. It would help to persuade and assuage the mortgage belt, end property speculation concessions and increase public housing. With greater social solidarity a less diverse community would have more care and concern for each other and this agenda would be an easier sell. With greater social capital the political machinery pushing it would be more effective at working together.

Ending demand driven, uncapped visas with low or no wage thresholds would limit the influx of economic migrants which would reverse the rental increases. An energised, vindicated and jubilant progressive coalition could then lock this in and continue it at the next election.

As a minor side issue, lower immigration would also hasten the end of the housing crisis. We know this from chart 5.18 the government’s own 2025 State of the Housing System report.

That report found that – wait for it – changes in population growth will change the amount of surplus housing available to clear the housing shortage. A government that hastened the end of the housing crisis might even find itself endeared to voters.